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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to outline the analytical value of a friendship perspective 
through two of IR's core concepts: security and power. It first discusses the relevance 
of friendship as a process providing ontological security to actors, including states, 
and differentiates this from the function of both strategic alliances and security 
communities. Building on this reading the paper explores the ways power 
operates in and out of friendship relations. Specifically, it looks at the power 
operating ‘internally’ that is, among friends, and ‘externally’, that is, how practices of 
friendship affect third parties and international order. It suggests that friends (can) 
exercise power in two basic ways, namely through mutual empowerment and through 
agenda setting in building international order, and that this power is 
both creative/transformative and exclusionary/subversive and may also be 
violent in character. Overall, this discussion also serves to make the point that 
friendship is not necessarily a lovefest and must be understood as a political 
relationship. 
Introduction
Claims of ‘friendship’ and ‘special relationships’ are found regularly in the political 
discourse, and ‘the friend’ is a commonly used term in the International Relations (IR) 
literature. And yet, this literature still contains very little substantial thinking about the 
meaning of friendship. Indeed, with the understanding of friendship in IR still in its 
infancy, we have difficulties seeing it even when looking at it. The reason is that most 
thinking in IR continues to build on the liberal ontology of actors as autonomy-
seeking entities and is reluctant to conceive of them as social-psychological 
phenomena.1 Even among scholars emphasizing a social ontology, the Other tends to 
take on the form of an enemy. Where friendship is discussed it is done thinly, 
portraying it as either a mere opposite of enmity or as a label for states forming a 
‘security community’ (Adler and Barnett 1998; Wendt 1999). Yet friendship is much 
1 Indeed, modernity’s concern with individualism poses the greatest challenge for conceiving of 
friendship across disciplines (King and Devere 2000). 
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more than a relationship in which disputes are settled by peaceful means. Thinkers on 
the topic going back to Aristotle provide us with a rich understanding of friendship as 
a relationship characterized by trust, openness, honesty, acceptance, reciprocity, 
solidarity and loyalty (Fehr 1996: 3-16). In line with the overall objective of this 
volume, this chapter attempts to make friendship conceptually intelligible for students 
of international politics.  
 
Given that friendship is generally considered a personal and private affair, one would 
be excused to assume that the concept is irrelevant for the collective level and lacks 
political relevance. And yet it is not too difficult to locate phenomena like trust, 
reciprocity, or morality in the political arena and recognize them as long-standing 
concerns of actors and as structuring international relations. Taking these phenomena 
into account, I build on my earlier work to pursue the view that friendship does exist 
on the international level and that, moreover, it significantly affects two core issues IR 
scholars have traditionally been concerned with, namely security and power. To put it 
the other way around, the claim made here is that phenomena of security and power in 
international relations cannot be fully understood without taking into account 
dynamics of friendship. 
 
This claim does not cater to one particular theoretical tradition. Security and power 
are traditionally the concern of realist scholars, who view them as basic human 
interests explaining political behaviour and interaction in terms of both conflict and 
cooperation. Yet my suggestion that friendship deeply affects issues of security and 
power – whether treated as basic motivations or as structural phenomena – is not an 
attempt to bring friendship into realism (although phenomena of friendship may well 
be compatible with sophisticated realist thinking). Questions of security and power 
are central to many other schools of thought from liberalism to post-structuralism, 
although their conceptualisation might be different. Indeed, if anything, the below 
account builds on the fact that those two concepts are quite complex and have 
different facets, which perhaps brings it closer to the constructivist camp. In the end, 
and in line with the overarching objective of this volume, the broader aim is more to 
encourage analysts to pay attention to friendship and integrate it into their analytical 
repertoire whatever the theoretical score. Towards this end, the chapter will first lay 
out my conceptualisation of (international) friendship, followed by discussions of how 
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it is linked to questions of security and then power, respectively, as well as showing 
that the two also are intertwined through friendship. 
 
Approaching Friendship 
Friendship is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. There is no blueprint for it. So 
in approaching the difficult task of conceptualising friendship it is helpful to make use 
of some key analytical frames. To begin with, friendship is special. Sociologists and 
philosophers tend to agree that ‘true’ friends are few in number and are tied through a 
particular and morally significant relationship. While this relationship can take many 
forms, the cosmopolitan dream of a bond among all humankind is not suitable to 
serve as the basis for a serious discussion of friendship. As friends are closer to each 
other than they are to non-friends, one might say friendship is an intimate relationship 
(Berenskoetter 2007).  
 
In order to get a better grasp on the nature and consequences of this ‘closeness’, it is 
furthermore helpful to consider two analytical juxtapositions. The first, which goes all 
the way back to Aristotle’s discussion of friendships of excellence, of pleasure and of 
utility, is the distinction between ‘end’ and ‘instrumental’ friendship (Badhwar 1993: 
3). The former sees one caring for the friend simply because of who (s)he is. It 
emphasises friendship as a loving relationship based on “the friend herself as the 
particular person she is, that is, as constituted by her fundamental qualities” (Badhwar 
1993: 4). In other words, friendship is an end in itself and serves no higher goal than 
caring for each other. By contrast, actors in an instrumental friendship need the 
relationship for other purposes. Although in behavioural terms it shows all the 
features of friendship, the bond does not go as deep as the end friendship and only 
lasts as long as the friend remains ‘useful’. As Badhwar (1993: 3) puts it “if either 
friend ceased to be useful in helping the other to reach her goals, she would thereby 
cease to have the features that ground the friendship”. Now, most friendships 
probably are a bit of both and so it is in the account below. Certainly in the case of 
international friendship it is difficult to argue that we are dealing with a relationship 
based purely on collectives falling in love with each other. Arguably most friendships 
form out of an instrumental relationship, where the initial interaction is driven by 
detached utilitarian motives, which then moves to another level as the actors come to 
know and appreciate each other’s qualities. Yet it would be misleading to read this 
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process as a neat sequence in which ‘utility’ is entirely replaced by ‘care’. Surely, as 
John Cooper (1980) points out, genuinely wishing the friend good for his own sake is 
essential to all friendships. But even though it is this other level of caring for each 
other that makes a friendship distinct, the bond is not devoid of utilitarian, or 
instrumental, functions.  
 
The second is David Kahane’s (1999) distinction between ‘object centered’ and 
‘relationship centered’ friendship.2 The former is similar to the ‘end’ friendship noted 
above and emphasizes that friendship is based primarily on attributes inherent in the 
friend, “specific values or virtues or understandings or assets that draws us to them” 
(Kahane 1999: 270). It is an essentialist reading of friendship where bonds are formed 
because the actors involved share the same intrinsic properties. Echoing Hannah 
Arendt and Jacques Derrida, Kahane criticizes this reading for not allowing difference 
to exist within friendship and for encouraging a rather teleological or, one might say, 
totalizing view of friendship. It also provides a static picture. Assuming that core 
attributes of the other are stable, friendship does not form but, once we recognise each 
other’s qualities, it just is. In contrast, the ‘relationship-centered’ friendship 
emphasizes not properties but the relationship as such for “its value as a formative 
process over time”. Kahane favours this reading because it allows for a certain 
distance between friends, that is, it allows for the fact that friends may not completely 
agree about everything. Rather than suggesting that friendship is built on ‘sameness’, 
this account gives room for pluralist understandings of ‘the good’, which is complex 
and may even contain contradictions. It thus carries a more pluralist/heterogonous 
understanding of friendship and points to the relationship as a site where differences 
can be ‘bridged’. It shifts the perspective from individual attributes to the relationship 
of friendship as something developed ‘in-between’ friends (Kahane 1999: 270).  As 
Kahane puts it friends need not have the ‘same’ perspective on everything but “[they] 
‘triangulate’, in effect, on a third object – the friendship itself” (Kahane 1999: 279).  
 
My account takes a ‘relationship-centered’ perspective for three reasons. First, it 
forces us to not simply think about two actors and their behaviour towards each other 
but about their relationship. That is, it requires conceptualising not only what makes a 
                                                
2 Kahane differentiates between three types of friendship, though he does not really elaborate on the 
second one which he calls ‘capacity centered’. 
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friend but also the intersubjective dimension, the bonds of friendship. Second, the 
notion of friendship as a process prompts us to understand the bond as dynamic, as 
something that evolves and needs to be observed over a period of time, rather than 
something static that can be captured through a snap shot of stable properties. Third, 
by reading the ‘in-between’ as a negotiated space where differences are bridged and a 
shared world is built, it also allows thinking about friendship as a political 
relationship. That said, in my reading friendship and the emerging something 
underpinning it is not a separate ‘third’ hanging between actors, but is constituted by 
and through them and, thus, is tied to their very ontology. As such, my account of 
friendship and, by extension, of security and of power, rests on a particular ontology 
of actors and their needs. To elaborate this, let us turn to the link between friendship 
and security.  
 
Friendship and Security 
Any discussion of security requires an account of what we want to secure, that is, the 
nature of the referent object, and an understanding of what the threats to this object 
are. For IR scholars the answer used to be very clear. The reference object was the 
Westphalian state and maintaining its security meant, above all, protecting its 
sovereignty, which realists conveniently reduced to meaning territorial integrity 
(Hobson 2000: 56ff; Mearsheimer 2001: 31). Thus, for a state to survive meant 
primarily to remain safe from external military threats. This materialist reading of 
referent object and threats is concerned with what scholars have termed ‘physical’ 
security. In this reading, states qualify as friendly if they agree to respect each other’s 
sovereignty and rule out military force as a means to solve disputes amongst them. In 
the strongest terms, friendship would be an agreement of solidarity to help each other 
if one of them is being threatened, expressed for instance in NATO’s article five. This 
account of friendship is well established in the IR literature. It has a home in the idea 
of collective security and scholarship on alliances and security communities.3  
 
While the material reading of security remains dominant in IR, the concept has been 
broadened. Especially among European scholars we have seen a vivid debate over the 
meaning of security and an embrace of new frameworks for analysis (Buzan et al. 
                                                
3 Walt (1987); Adler and Barnett (1998); Mueller (2002). 
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1998) and an understanding of security as a “discursive formation” (Huysmans 1998). 
Scholarship in this tradition highlights that not only are referent objects and threats 
socially constructed; their meaning also is a frequent object of political contestation. 
One approach that has made significant inroad in this discussion is the constructivist 
emphasis on identity as the referent object. This is the approach adopted here. 
Identities are a fundamental element of being, hence to speak of the security of an 
identity is no esoteric matter. Indeed, identities are so central that some have come to 
speak of ‘ontological security’, a concept stemming from the psychological literature 
that enjoys growing popularity among IR scholars and referring to a stable ‘sense of 
Self’  (Giddens 1991). I will use this term here acknowledging that it privileges a 
particular ontological feature, namely identity.4 In general terms, the literature 
suggests that an actor feels ontologically secure if it is able to reduce (tame/control) 
the anxiety brought about by the radical uncertainty of life; that is, if it manages to 
generate a satisfactory degree of certainty and predictability in both everyday life and 
long term orientation. Put differently, ontological security is achieved by ‘knowing’ 
ones’ place within and, thus, relation to, the world, by having a clear sense of who and 
where one is. 
 
The argument here is that friendship plays an important role in generating that 
knowledge and, hence, in providing ontological security. But how are we to think 
about this? How and why does friendship stabilise a sense of Self?5 To begin with, it 
would be misleading to suggest that friendship ‘protects’ the identities of the actors 
involved as this could be read as implying a pre-existing and fixed identity. Yet we 
know that identities are not fixed or given but evolving and complex. So a reflection 
about why and how friendship provides ontological security must be embedded in an 
understanding of how identities form. In other words, carving out the relevance of 
friendship in providing a stable sense of Self requires a basic understanding of the 
process in which ‘Selves’ take shape. Moreover, I suggest that friendship is not 
                                                
4 Giddens (1991) uses the term in his exploration of self-identity. IR scholars like Mitzen (2006) and 
Steele (2008) then adopt if from Giddens to make a distinction between physical and ontological 
security. While this works as a strategic move to introduce a new concept, it would be a mistake to treat 
the two as categories of the same order. After all, physical being is just as much a part of my ontology 
as is psychological or emotional being. In the same vein, identity can be based as much on physical 
features as on ideational or discursive ones. So it may be more accurate to speak of psychological, or 
emotional, security. 
5 Scholars of friendship alluded to this function (Allan 1989: 59ff; Pahl 2000: 68f), as have scholars of 
identity (Giddens 1991: 87-98), yet without greater depth. The two literatures also rarely meet. 
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simply added to but woven into this process. Friendship and Self are ontologically 
intertwined. And so an understanding of how identities form, how a stable sense of 
Self is generated, also allows us to grasp the ontological parameters of friendship. 
Thus, and quite importantly, in the account presented here the very conceptualisation 
of friendship emerges out of and is intertwined with a theory of identity formation.6  
 
With this in mind, let me briefly outline the theory employed here.7 It builds on the 
phenomenological insight that humans, as individuals and collectives, are incomplete 
beings that unfold into the world. Their identities are formed not separately from the 
world but are intertwined with it. More precisely, their sense of Self develops together 
with an understanding of their socio, spatial and temporal environment. Gaining an 
‘identity’, then, is about finding and defining ones’ place in an unknown world by 
creating a meaningful structure of social, spatial and temporal relations and 
orientations. These structures of meanings are bundled in a biographical narrative that 
offers a reservoir of memories and visions, which situate the Self in a socio-spatial 
past and future. The biographical narrative, in other words, provides the Self with 
horizons of experience and of possibilities which enable it to ‘make sense’ of where it 
comes from and where it could be going. Out of those the Self spins an idea of order 
whose guiding principles – norms and values – manifest what counts as good 
behaviour. As such, the narrative functions as an “anxiety controlling mechanism” 
(Giddens 1984: 50) that provides cognitive and emotional stability by positioning the 
Self in a ‘known’ world from and towards which it can act.  
 
Psychologists have long explored how individuals build and sustain such narratives 
for their ontological security and as I discuss elsewhere a similar phenomenon occurs 
on the collective level (Berenskoetter 2012). 8 That said, even national biographies are 
not built and sustained in isolation but in interaction with others. Two arguments can 
be made in this regard. First, actors want to have their identities recognised by others. 
Thus, a community that identifies with a particular biographical narrative will also 
seek external recognition of that narrative. Exactly whose recognition is sought then 
                                                
6 To be sure, this is just one way to tackle the phenomenon of friendship, but it seems inevitable once 
we accept the intrinsic role friendship in identity formation. 
7 For an elaboration of this account, see Berenskoetter (2012). 
8 Of course, the state is a social configuration that cannot simply be anthropomorphized. Yet 
scholarship exploring the phenomena of nationalism and other forms of collective identity formation 
has shown that a sense of Self also exists among collectives. 
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becomes a crucial and often overlooked question. Here it suffices to say that 
recognition is required not from just anybody or indeed everybody, but from a 
significant Other. Second, it is hard to imagine a biographical narrative formulated 
without links to an external Other. Communities formally separated by, for instance, 
state borders often have overlapping memories and ideas of order. To be sure, overlap 
per se does not provide ontological security; whether that is achieved depends on how 
the overlap is dealt with.  
 
For the sake of simplicity, let us say that overlap can produce two kinds of relations: 
enmity, where stability is achieved through borders, and friendship, where stability is 
achieved through bonds. Much of the IR literature focuses on the former and 
emphasizes the use enemy images as anxiety controlling mechanisms (Campbell 
1998; Neumann 1999; Weldes et al 1999;). Here the argument would be that two 
actors with overlapping biographical narratives compete for the ownership over the 
narrative or, more precisely, they seek control over the contested elements of the 
narrative and its practical manifestation. In trying to gain this control one actor will 
try to discredit and denounce the competitor’s narrative as dangerous and label this 
Other an enemy.9 While the Other may reciprocate in the same way, thereby granting 
recognition to the Self and establishing a relationship of emnity, an enemy image can 
also be a purely narcissist construct, a process which involves little, if any, interaction 
and in which the Other has limited, if any, agency.  
 
I suggest that friendship is a more promising and, indeed, preferred approach. If we 
take seriously the premise that ontological security is achieved through interaction 
between Self and significant Other, it seems plausible to choose a relationship capable 
of making productive use of the relationship. Thus, we turn to friendship because it 
does what enmity cannot, namely compel the actors to creatively support each other in 
formulating and sustaining their respective narratives through a shared idea of 
international order. That is, friends not only positively recognise each other’s 
narratives, they also strengthen them by making productive use of their overlapping 
experienced space and link it to a shared future. In other words, they commit to 
investing in a shared spatio-temporal conception of the world. To be sure, no two 
                                                
9 The logic is expressed in William Connolly’s (1991) discussion of the problem of evil.  
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worldviews are identical, nor are they fixed, and so a significant aspect of friendship 
is about negotiating a shared idea of international order that both sides want to invest 
in. I will take a closer look at this below; for now it suffices to say that friendship is 
understood here as a special relationship of choice which does not simply form on the 
basis of geographic proximity, close trade links or an otherwise high level of 
‘interaction’, but through a mutual commitment to use overlapping biographical 
narratives for pursuing a shared idea of international order. Although it draws on 
shared experiences and lessons learned, this shared idea is forward-looking in the 
sense that it is about building that order in a shared future.10 As C. S. Lewis (1993: 
43) puts it, all friends are “travellers on the same quest, have all a common vision”. 
Thus, one might say that states form a friendship through a shared project of ‘world 
building’ where commitment is confirmed through practices considered by both sides 
as adequate investments towards realising the shared vision of international order.  
 
An example here is the Franco-German relationship following the Second World War. 
Both societies emerged out of the war fractioned and ontologically insecure, needing 
to regain self-confidence and a stable sense of being in the world. Their governments 
addressed that need by embedding their post-war Selves in a shared project of 
integration. Without downplaying their history of antagonism, violence and 
humiliation, German and French leaders used the overlapping experienced space to 
negotiate and invest in a shared vision of political unity in Europe. To be sure, having 
to overcome deep-seated feelings of enmity, building up a friendship was a long 
process that only slowly, and imperfectly, came to involve civil society and establish 
special bilateral ties on the elite level.11 As such the Franco-German case illustrates 
that international friendship is a political choice, never free from tension and requiring 
on-going commitment, yet also has a structural component that survives changes in 
government. In addition, it reminds that friendship is built not just on the basis of 
shared ideas of order but also through doing things together. While narratives provide 
frames of meaning, as Aristotle already emphasised friendship is also carried by 
common activities, that is, by doing things together. Such activities can take a variety 
                                                
10 Note this differs from Kahane (1999) who only emphasizes the importance of a shared history. On 
the relevance of the future/visions for identity formation, see Berenskoetter (2011).  
11 See, for instance, Gardner Feldman (2012, Ch.3) and the contribution by Vion in this volume. 
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of forms, from regular routine interaction to special symbolic acts, consciously chosen 
to generate shared experiences and enhance the shared project.12  
 
Friendship and Power 
Friendship is not only a potent anxiety controlling mechanism and provides 
ontological security, it is also a significant source of power. Gaining a better 
understanding of how power operates between and through friendship is not only 
important to enhance our understanding of the difference it makes in the world, it also 
helps us see friendship as a political relationship and how it matters in international 
politics.13 In what follows, I suggest that friendship exercises power both in a 
productive, creative sense and in exclusionary, discriminatory ways. Before outlining 
this, however, it is necessary to clarify the meaning(s) of power employed. This is not 
easy as power is an essentially contested concept. In the IR literature it was long 
dominated by realists who over time reduced its meaning to military resources and 
territorial control (Mearsheimer 2001).14 The past decade has seen renewed attention 
paid to different kinds of ‘soft power’, ranging from Joseph Nye’s (2004) liberal 
version to more structural ones drawing on Neo-Gramscian accounts of power as 
ideological control or Foucault’s notion of governmentality established in everyday 
practice (Guzzini and Neumann 2012). I suggest that both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power are 
at play in and out of friendship, yet to grasp them it is useful to take a step back and 
recall how the very concept of power can be understood in two fundamentally 
different ways, namely in terms of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’.   
 
The ‘power over’ approach is well represented in Robert Dahl’s definition of power 
as ‘A getting B to do something B would otherwise not do’ (Dahl 1961). This 
conception, which can be traced back to Max Weber’s classic notion of power as 
having one’s will prevail in a social relationship, is generally understood as 
expressing a hierarchy between A and B. This understanding resonates with Dahl’s 
study, which attempted to measure who possesses ‘power’ in a political community. 
More precisely, he sought to show ‘who governs’ by identifying who was most 
                                                
12 See also the list compiled by Oelsner and Vion (2011: 137). I disagree with Giddens’ emphasis on 
everyday routines as the primary anxiety controlling mechanism, generally adopted by IR scholars 
discussing phenomena of ontological security (Giddens 1984: 50; 1991: 37; Mitzen 2006).  
13 Here I follow Karl Deutsch’s (1967) view that political relations are relations of power. 
14 Classical realists, such as Carr, Morgenthau, or Aron had a more sophisticated understanding. See 
also Schmidt (2005). 
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successful in advancing preferences in a series of decisions. Dahl did so by first 
recording conflicting preferences for the outcome of a given decision among the 
actors involved to then analyze whose interests prevailed by recording successes and 
defeats in the decision-making process (Dahl 1961). The resulting understanding of 
power as prevailing in observable conflict between A and B and, hence of A 
exercising power over B, is popular among IR scholars and often reduced to mean 
domination and control through coercive means.  
 
The ‘power to’ lens captures a very different facet of power by directing attention to 
the phenomenon of (collective) empowerment as highlighted by Talcott Parsons and 
Hannah Arendt. Rooted in an Aristotelian understanding of human nature, Arendt 
defines power as “the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” (Arendt 1970: 
44). Rather than seeing power expressed in hierarchy and obedience, Arendt sees 
power as creative, as something productive. Like Parsons (1963), who argued that 
power flows from a social system’s potential to coordinate human activity and 
resources towards (shared) goals, Arendt points to the force that emerges through 
people coming together, as exemplified in non-violent resistance movements. This 
communal, or consensual, conception of power shifts the focus away from Weber’s 
emphasis on the ‘prevailing will’ to the extent that ‘acting in concert’ creates 
something new that has not been there before.  
 
Employing both of the above readings helps to see the various ways in which power 
operates through friendship. The following will first discuss how friendship is a form 
of empowerment, or ‘power to’, and then outline how this opens the door to ‘power 
over’ phenomena. 
 
Friendship as Empowerment 
A useful starting point for seeing that friendship involves power is the notion that the 
formation and maintenance of friendship is based on some sort of mutual attraction.15  
Conventionally understood as a force through which two units are magnetically drawn 
towards each other, attraction may first appear as a form of power two actors exercise 
‘over’ each other. However, in line with the earlier point on the relational and process 
                                                
15 While IR scholars note that attraction is a central aspect of ‘soft power’, they have not gotten very far 
in conceptualizing, let alone measuring it. For attempts, see Nye (2004); Bially Mattern (2005). 
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aspect of friendship, attraction here is less (or primarily) about the Other but about 
what the relationship enables friends to achieve together. Take, for instance, Peter 
Blau’s (1964: 69) suggestion that attraction rests on approving of each others opinion. 
In the case of international friendship this opinion would be the conception of the 
good life embedded in a shared idea of international order and affirmed through 
practice, that is, through an agreement how to create that order. There are several 
aspects here that need to be looked at more closely. 
 
To begin with, this idea is negotiated on the basis of overlapping national narratives, 
that is, on the basis of a sufficiently shared bundle of significant experiences and 
visions that resonate with each other.16 Rather than a natural fit, resonance designates 
a potential that is productively exploited in negotiation over a shared idea of 
international order and fulfilled in a project of ‘world building’. As such, the mutual 
approval of each other’s opinions, or worldviews, is neither natural nor total, but 
emerges between friends. Second, the mutual agreement on an idea of international 
order not only provides a sense of orientation it also strengthens the actors resolve to 
pursue it. This process is not merely stabilizing the friends’ sense of being in the 
world, it empowers them: the creative force emerging out of the process of ‘world 
building’ expresses Arendt’s aforementioned reading of power as the ability to act in 
concert and to achieve/produce something together (see also Chiba 1995: 523). In 
other words, the power at work here is productive (power-to) rather than coercive 
(power-over). It lies in the creative potential of overlapping biographical narratives 
and is an emerging property generated through reciprocal investment in an idea and, 
thus, a form of social exchange (Blau 1964).  
 
So if we accept that gaining ontological security through friendship is not merely 
about preserving but building something (together), we can see that this project 
empowers in various ways. The psychologically informed notion of friendship as an 
anxiety controlling mechanisms sees it as providing a cognitive devise enabling 
orientation in time and space both sides feel comfortable with. Yet as philosophers of 
friendship all the way back to Aristotle have argued, friendship is also an important 
source for moral growth and provision of happiness (Sherman 1993). We can see how 
                                                
16 On resonance, see Marcussen et al. (1999); Payne (2001).  
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moral growth and achieving happiness are empowering if we accept that a happy 
person with strong moral convictions acts differently from someone who is unhappy 
and unsure about its moral standing. The former arguably displays a higher level of 
self-confidence and sense of self-sufficiency (albeit one embedded in friendship). Or, 
as mentioned earlier, that actor shows more resolve to pursue a certain path. That said, 
while we can say that friendship exerts ‘power to’ by giving us a sense of what is ‘the 
right thing to do’, it is important to take on board Lewis’ reminder that strong moral 
convictions should not be equated with goodness. Although for Aristotle and most 
ancient philosophers true friendship was a feature of the virtuous and moral growth 
meant coming closer to fully achieving the good life (and, thus, happiness),17 this 
must be qualified from both a relativist and universalist standpoint. It is not only that 
friends’ pursuit of an idea of international order in a world of moral pluralism may 
have negative consequences, as discussed below. Friends may also reinforce each 
other’s ‘bad’ views. In Lewis’ words, “Friendship can be a school of virtue; but also a 
school of vice... It makes good men better and bad men worse” (Lewis 1993: 46).  
 
In either case, the productive effect of friendship can be witnessed in two ways. The 
first is learning. As captured in the notion of friendship contributing to moral growth, 
in the process of shared world building friendship does not merely strengthen the Self 
but transforms it as well (Friedman 1993: 195-202; Allan 1989). Because biographical 
narratives are never identical, the creative potential of friendship is drawn from the 
unique experiences and expectations held by the parties which enable them to 
exchange views and provide each other with slightly different perspectives, thereby 
stimulating the learning process. As Marilyn Friedman (1993: 197) notes,  
 
“the experiences, projects, and dreams of our friends can frame for us 
new standpoints from which we can experience the significance and 
worth of moral values and standards. In friendship, our commitment to 
our friends, as such, affords us access to whole ranges of experience 
beyond our own”.  
 
                                                
17 I am aware that I am in danger here of conflating the two, effectively reducing happiness to moral 
fulfillment. Yet separating them out and discussing the relationship requires a deeper philosophical 
discussion for which I lack both space and expertise. 
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This learning process requires that friends are willing to share concerns and to listen, 
that they are open for learning and moral growth. It is also here, in satisfying 
recognition needs and in mutually providing stimuli and energy for common projects, 
where friends relate as equals and contribute on a unique logic of reciprocity (see 
below). Empowerment understood as a transformative process implies that friends 
must not only “respect and take an interest in one another’s perspectives” (Friedman 
1993: 189) but are also willing to adapt and recognize the productive benefits arising 
from doing so. Applied to the state level, this implies the willingness to adapt 
domestic orders and the narratives which uphold them, in line with James Rosenau’s 
(1981) notion of states as adaptive entities changing in response to stimuli from 
salient environments. To be sure, this does not rule out the possibility that 
disagreements arise over how to read ‘the world’. What matters is that compromises 
are made voluntarily, arrived at through deliberations characterized by respect for 
occasional divergence of views and the willingness for mutual understanding, 
solidarity and, again, learning (Risse-Kappen 1995).  
 
A second mechanism of mutual empowerment lies in the fact that friends (are 
expected to) help each other. Or, as Aristotle put it, true friendship is based on 
reciprocated goodwill (NE, Book VIII, 2 and 8; Smith-Pangle, 2003: 142ff). This is 
expressed in the phenomenon of solidarity among friends, which can be understood as 
an expression of support, as providing help in times of need. In this case, the need for 
friendship as an anxiety controlling mechanisms is continuous. Said differently, the 
notion of friendship as a dynamic process and a ‘shared life’ (Sherman 1993) suggests 
that it is not very useful to conceive of solidarity as a singular or isolated act.  It is 
also more than voicing support. Without downplaying the symbolic importance of 
rhetorical gestures, the practical contribution which substantiates the commitment to 
shared world building is arguably of greater relevance, in particular if solidarity is 
expressed in the realm of security policy and is likely to involve some sort of 
sacrifice. Yet an act of sacrifice for the friend is not an act of altruism: because it is to 
benefit not merely the friend but is to sustain the friendship, the common project, it 
also is an act of self-empowerment.  
 
Equally, while expressions of solidarity, and the commitment to cooperation/support 
they entail, rarely come with a time limit attached, they are not valid indefinitely. A’s 
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solidarity with B is maintained if it is recognised and valued by B and not perceived 
as exploitation by A. As such, practices of solidarity are part of a process of 
continuous social exchange in which both sides invest in the shared project and, thus, 
contribute to mutual empowerment. To be sure, reciprocity in friendship does not 
follow a ‘tit-for-tat’ logic and cannot be seen in terms of an instrumental or utilitarian 
notion of exchange (Hutter 1978: 3; Pahl 2000: 55). This is because, as Aristotle 
notes, notions of value, return and debt are difficult to assess within friendship. Yet 
while “friendship seeks what is possible, not what accords with worth” (NE, Book 
VIII, 14), friends have to give proportionate to their abilities. In other words, while it 
is clear that among friends there really can be no expectations about what is an 
appropriate return, this does not mean that no return is expected. It just means that “it 
is enough … to do what we can” (NE Book XI, 1).  
 
Mutual empowerment through learning and solidarity is a process that can be 
witnessed over time, yet they also play out in particular situations. The cooperation 
between the US and the UK in the run-up to intervening in Iraq in 2003 is an example 
for the latter. Of course, this cooperation built on a longstanding ‘special relationship’ 
and, thus, had a structural element that carried the positive personal relationship 
between the political leaders, George W. Bush and Tony Blair. It also followed 
military interventions carried out together in Kosovo (1999) and Afghanistan (2001), 
which both displayed acts of solidarity and reciprocity. Yet the Iraq case is significant 
because, facing potent criticism about the wisdom and legitimacy of the intervention, 
the two governments mutually empowered each other in affirming the righteousness 
of their moral assessment about Saddam Hussein as ‘evil’, the necessity of regime 
change and the appropriateness of military force. While neither the US nor the UK 
faced a military threat from Iraq, the collaboration rested on a shared self-
understanding as (in many respects rather unequal) co-leaders of the Western world 
with a historical responsibility and a shared vision of international order, including a 
transformed Gulf region. The mutually confirmed narrative of having to ‘carry the 
burden’ for the free world strengthened their resolve and belief in having a good 
cause, allowing both governments to claim legitimacy for their action despite the 
lacking UNSC approval and resistance from NATO allies like Germany and France. 
Their internal agreement saw both sides making concessions to help each other, such 
as Bush supporting Blair’s attempt to get a UN mandate, and it allowed for very 
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different contributions. While Britain could not provide significant material support to 
the operation, Blair played a crucial role rhetorically in making the case for war to the 
American public (via Congress), demonstrating that the Bush administration had 
‘good’ Europeans on its side.  
 
Friendship and Power Over 
The above example already indicates that the process of mutual empowerment throws 
up some further facets of power operating within and out of friendship. The remainder 
of this chapter will first look at power operating internal to friendship, noting that it 
holds holds significant potential for friends to wield power over each other. It then 
delineates how friendship exerts power externally by undercutting international order 
and excluding, even exercising violence over, others.  
 
Let’s begin with how friends (can) affect each other. One significant effect of 
friendship exemplified above is that it levels hierarchy. To the extent that the friend is 
considered ‘another Self’ it cannot, logically speaking, be conceived of as inferior or 
superior to the Self. As Aristotle (NE, Book VIII, 7 and 11) suggests, formal 
inequality can be compensated through similarity in virtue (a sense of what is ‘right’), 
making friendship the one thing which can transcend otherwise divisive hierarchies.18 
As joint investors into the shared project of creating the good life, friends regard each 
other as equal. This equality does not refer to a right that can be claimed but to an 
unspoken recognition that the choices and judgments are made from the ‘same’ 
baseline and for the same aspirations of world building. Thus, as indicated in the US-
UK example, this sense of equality – expressed not least in the negotiation of the 
shared project and mutual recognition of each other’s narrative –bridges inequalities 
in material resources or formal institutional standing.  
 
Yet bonds of friendship also inversely create a relationship of interdependence: by 
empowering each other in pursuing a project that entwines their national biographies, 
friends also come to depend on each other for sustaining the same. Said differently, 
the social capital contained in friendship, namely the ability to sustain a project that 
provides ontological security for both, turns into a soft-power relationship in which 
                                                
18 See also Hutter (1978); Kutcher (2000). 
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interdependence exposes its flip side, namely vulnerability.19 Thus, the reliance on the 
friend also creates a ‘power-over’ potential: precisely because the significant Other is 
so vital in sustaining a stable sense of Self, it also has the capacity to undermine it. As 
Horst Hutter (1978: 12) puts it: “there is no one who is as vulnerable to the actions of 
Self as a friend (…) no power is as total as the power one has over friends”. This 
vulnerability becomes a factor when there is deep and enduring dissonance among 
friends over what makes an appropriate contribution to the shared project. I will not 
speculate here about what causes dissonance, except to note Aristotle’s point that 
significant shifts in formal status and resources/assets amongst friends changes 
conceptions of what/how much can be contributed to the shared project, which in turn 
may lead to false expectations and a (perceived) corruption of reciprocity (NE, Book 
VIII, 14). In that case, we may witness the emergence of a power over phenomenon 
where friends (perhaps unintentionally) coerce each other into changing their 
behaviour by applying what Bially Mattern (2005) calls “representational force”.20 
 
Perhaps more relevant for students of international politics is how friendship exerts 
power externally. Whereas modern sociology long assumed that the intimate character 
of friendship had no broader consequence for society, scholars have now caught up 
with thinkers like Georg Simmel (1950) and Hutter (1978) in recognizing that 
friendships are capable of both carrying and undermining/transforming order (Allan 
1989, 1998). These ‘external’ effects of friendship become apparent once one takes 
into account that the world-building process does not take place in a social vacuum. 
After all, the world built by friends is not that intimate, which is to say that the ‘in-
between’ in friendship relations is not an exclusive space. Broadly speaking, friends 
can be seen as affecting third parties/international order in two ways.  
 
First, as illustrated in the US-UK decision to go to war against Iraq without a UN 
mandate and violating a basic principle of international society, namely sovereignty, 
friendship has the power of undercutting an established international order. This arises 
out of the fact that friends apply a double standard when operating in a social 
environment. Most obviously, friends trust each other more than they trust others and 
                                                
19 This duality inherent in relationships of interdependence is discussed for the economic realm by 
Keohane and Nye (1989).  
20 For examples of such dynamics, see Bially Mattern (2005); Berenskoetter and Giegerich (2010). 
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so are more likely to reveal and discuss their true intentions, concerns and agendas 
with friends than anyone else. As Goffman (in Allan 1989: 59) puts it “the self that is 
revealed in our dealings with our friends is closer to our self definition than the ‘self’ 
we portray in other contexts…friends are permitted ‘backstage’ more than most”. 
Moreover, in their support for each other friends do not necessarily abide to formal 
rules and regulations. By definition they privilege each other over others, and so if 
their commitment to solidarity is in conflict with a broader normative framework 
postulating neutrality, or impartiality, friends ignore it and engage in what from 
another perspective appears as corrupt practice. In doing so, they display disrespect 
for this order and undermine its legitimacy. Hence it can be said that “every real 
friendship is a sort of secession, even a rebellion” (Lewis 1993: 46) 
 
Second, as perhaps more visible in the Franco-German example of investing in the 
project of European integration, the creative potential within friendship may also 
come to benefit others and strengthen international order. Even if friendship is a 
special, or intimate relationship, the international order friends seek to build does not 
need to be ‘closed’ to others or detrimental to their interests/identities. Here 
international institutions come to play an important role. While there is no doubt that 
friends interact informally and, in a sense, privately, this does not prevent them from 
also making extensive use of international institutions to negotiate, administer, and 
manifest the common project.21 Friends may adopt international institutions as 
vehicles for their ‘world building’ project, not only for their exclusive benefit but also 
to attract and receive support from third parties. Indeed, they may use international 
institutions to open up their project to others and include them, perhaps to even win 
them over as friends.  
 
That said, the conception of friendship as an intimate relationship existing in a 
broader international society means there always will be a tension/potential conflict 
between those two. And even if the project pursued by friends allows some others to 
benefit, that has its limits, too. For one, the application of a double standard does not 
merely exclude ‘third parties’ from decisions and leave them in the dark about the 
‘real’ reasons for doing X or Y. Because friendship is a source of self-confidence and 
                                                
21 For a discussion of institutions as structures of empowerment, see Ringmar (2007). 
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moral certainty, friends are less inclined to listen to strangers and learn from them, let 
along accept and engage their criticism. One consequence, visible in Washington and 
London when planning the intervention of Iraq, is a state of mind akin to ‘groupthink’ 
which creates a cognitive bias and allows leaders to ignore international and, indeed, 
internal doubts and opposition to their agenda. Moreover, the project pursued by 
friends may not only exclude and discriminate against others, but may also involve 
violent practices against those who (are perceived to) stand in its way, thus exercising 
‘power over’ in its most drastic form. US-British military cooperation to build and 
safeguard an idea of international order again offers fitting examples. For instance, as 
Peter Harris (2013) reminds, the American use of a joint military base on Diego 
Garcia, a British colony in the Indian Ocean and the largest of the Chagos islands, 
builds on the forceful removal of the native inhabitants of that island by the British 
government and on keeping them in exile. Thus, the Chagossians are third actors 
negatively affected by the US-UK friendship and one might say with Harris that they 
are integral to the relationship rather than situated outside of it. The military 
intervention in Iraq in 2003 also had significant and often deadly effect on many 
parties, not least by pushing Iraqi society into cycles of violence. And when the main 
justifying claim Washington and London had constructed – Iraq’s alleged WMD 
capabilities – unraveled and the many ‘unintended consequences’ of the intervention 
displayed the limited control the friends had over their vision of re-ordering the Gulf, 
one is reminded that friendship can also be a source of hubris.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that the phenomenon of (international) friendship greatly affects 
questions of ontological security and is a significant source of power. It suggested that 
friendship shapes and reinforces the identity of the actors involved; that is, it stabilises 
their sense of Self by embedding their respective biographical narratives in a shared 
project of ‘world building’. It was argued that friendship is not merely an anxiety 
controlling mechanism but empowers actors through mutual learning, 
reciprocity/solidarity and the provision of self-confidence through moral certainty. 
Although the discussion located friendship within a theory of identity formation, its 
relevance extends beyond the inter-subjective space between friends. Because friends 
do not float in a vacuum but are embedded in a larger social environment – an 
international society – their world building efforts not only create an exclusionary 
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space that seals friends from criticism and creates bias, but also promote an idea of 
international order which affects others. Thus, friendship is difficult to ignore when it 
comes to consider the sources and wider consequences of productive power, which, as 
was noted, can be quite violent vis-à-vis third parties.  
 
It will not have escaped the attentive reader that this chapter also made a fundamental 
point about what motivates collective behaviour. Namely, it assumed that humans, as 
individuals and collectives, seek ontological security and then suggested that 
friendship is the most effective way to satisfy this need. While this is not the place to 
further elaborate on this rather crucial move, it should be noted that this is not 
assumed to always be a conscious goal. In other words, I am not suggesting that 
actors are constantly on the lookout for friends, or weigh all their decisions according 
to whether they support a particular friendship. That said, the chapter does underscore 
Aristotle’s famous claim that “no one would choose to live without friends” (NE, 
Book VIII, 1). And so the extent that the attempt to gain and sustain ontological 
security through friendship emerges as a fundamental driver, the chapter has laid out 
the basis for a theory of action. IR still has a long way to go in developing such a 
theory. Hence, let me conclude by pointing to three areas for further research. First, 
while recognising that friends are few in number, there is the issue of multiple 
friendships and how we can conceptualise ‘circles’ of friends.22 Another question 
arising here is to what extent multiple friendships reinforce each other and at what 
point they come into conflict. Second, while one of the basic points of this chapter is 
that friendship does not rely on a shared enemy, there is the question of how enmity 
affects friendship. That is, without reverting back to Schmittian understandings of the 
political, we need to explore what role enemy images play within friendship. And 
finally, we need to know more not just about how friendships form and how they 
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